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We estimate monetary policy reaction functions for France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and the United States using a Markov-switching model that incor-
porates switching in the monetary policy regime as well as an independent switching
process for shifts in the state of the economy. Results indicate that over time all cen-
tral banks have assigned changing weights to inﬂation and the output gap. Regimes
can be classiﬁed as “dovish” with a high weight on output and a low weight on in-
ﬂation, and “hawkish” with a high weight on inﬂation and a low one on output. For
France and Italy, the German interest rate had an inﬂuence on domestic monetary
policy especially at the beginning of the 1980s after the inception of the European
Monetary System (EMS). Switching in the residual variance of the monetary rule
accounts for heteroscedasticity and turns out to be important for the ﬁt of the
model. Robustness of the results is checked by considering alternative speciﬁcations
of expected inﬂation and the output gap. In general, results are robust to these
changes.
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JEL classiﬁcations: E41, E58, C22The analysis of so-called monetary policy rules has become a widely used tool
to assess a central bank’s monetary policy. Though most central banks reject to
obey monetary policy rules as an orientation for day-to-day monetary policy,1 rules
permit an ex-post evaluation of monetary policy in terms of a few, economically rel-
evant variables. In this regard, the term “rule” used in the literature is misleading
because the empirical analysis of monetary policy rules is concerned with a descrip-
tive analysis of central bank behavior. Speaking of a monetary policy equation or a
central bank reaction function thus would be more appropriate, but in accordance
with most of the literature also here the term “rule” is used. By estimating a re-
action function for the central bank, monetary policy rules allow to analyze the
implicit goals of the central bank by determining the weight the central bank as-
signs to diﬀerent economic indicators. In this respect, estimated monetary policy
reaction functions can prove especially useful for the comparison of diﬀerent policies
across countries or over time.
One of the most widespread rules in the literature is the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993),
which assumes that the central bank reacts to deviations of inﬂation and output
from target. Taylor proposed his rule as a description of how the Federal Reserve
Bank (FED) conducts monetary policy and showed that his rule closely tracks the
actual federal funds rate in the United States from 1987 to 1992. Estimation of
monetary policy reaction functions for other periods and other countries yielded
similar results.2 Moreover, Taylor-type rules have shown to be a useful formulation
of monetary policy in simulations of diﬀerent macroeconomic models.3
Empirical studies of monetary policy rules are typically confronted with the prob-
lem that central-bank policy changes over time, especially when considering a longer
sample period.4 According to conventional wisdom, central banks in the 1970s put
a high weight on output while inﬂation was allowed to rise, whereas in the more
recent past most central banks concentrated on achieving low inﬂation, and output
goals received less attention. The central bank also may respond diﬀerently to eco-
nomic variables depending on the values they take in a particular situation, i.e., the
central bank may react asymmetrically to high and low values of inﬂation or output.
Additionally, external constraints have changed over time and may have enforced
1One main problem with monetary policy rules like the Taylor rule for actual policy formulation
is the imprecision of ﬁltering methods used for output gap estimation at the end of the sample
period, see e.g. Kozicki (1999), Deutsche Bundesbank (1999).
2See e.g. Clarida and Gertler (1997) for the Bundesbank, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1998) for
the G3 and three large EU countries, Wyplosz (1999) for the EU countries, and Mihov (2001) for
Germany, France, and Italy.
3See Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) or Christiano and Gust (1999).
4These changes may either take the form of a gradual shift or a sudden switch to another regime.
While a gradual shift in general would be better modelled by smooth transition models, this paper
is concerned with more or less abrupt changes of regime.
1diﬀerent policy reactions. While after the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods System
exchange rates in the 1970s in most economies followed a free ﬂoat, the 1980s saw
the successive hardening of the exchange rate constraint for the member countries
of the European Monetary System (EMS), which ﬁnally lead to the transition to
European Monetary Union (EMU).
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 the existing literature on time-
varying monetary policy rules is reviewed. Theoretical models based on asymmet-
ric central-bank preferences imply a time-varying reaction to economic variables.
Though empirical research on this topic is still in the beginning, non-linearities in
monetary policy rules seem to be of importance. Section 2 discusses the speciﬁcation
of the Markov-switching model and the estimation procedure. It is assumed that the
monetary policy regime switches according to a ﬁrst-order Markov process, while a
second independent Markov process determines switching in the residual variance of
the monetary policy rule. The countries investigated are France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Section 3 discusses the data and Section 4
presents the estimation results. Results show that the weights assigned to inﬂation
and the output gap follow two distinct regimes. The ﬁrst monetary policy regime
is associated with a high weight on inﬂation, while in the second regime the central
bank follows an accommodative policy. Following the terminology of Owyang and
Ramey (2000) one regime can be classiﬁed as “hawkish” because a high weight on
inﬂation is associated with a low one on output, whereas the other regime can be
termed as “dovish” with a high weight on output and a low weight on inﬂation.
In addition, the consequences of participation in the EMS for France and Italy are
explored. Switching in the residual variance is relevant for all countries and con-
tributes signiﬁcantly to an improvement over a simple linear model. Results are
found to be robust against changes in the deﬁnition of expected inﬂation and the
output gap. Section 5 concludes.
1 Time-Varying Monetary Policy Rules
In the literature various reasons have been discussed why central-bank reactions to
economic variables may vary over time. By studying the minutes of the FOMC
meetings, Romer and Romer (1989) ﬁnd that at certain times the FED has been
concerned about inﬂation and has been willing to take output losses. Blinder (1998,
p. 19) states that political pressure on the central bank is higher when it tight-
ens monetary policy preemptively than when it eases preemptively. Fischer (1994,
p. 293) presumes that dependent central bankers suﬀer from an inﬂationary bias,
while independent central bankers develop a deﬂationary bias. With increasing in-
2dependence, the central bank’s preference towards inﬂation presumably will shift.
While the change in independence is less relevant for the U.S. and Germany, other
countries, like the United Kingdom, France and Italy, have seen a fundamental shift
in their central bank constitutions, which could well have inﬂuenced the monetary
policy rule.
While inspection of central-banking practice conﬁrms the possibility of time-
varying responses to economic variables, also theoretical models give explanation for
asymmetric reactions to target variables. Amano, Coletti, and Macklem (1999) show
that central banks would have to adjust parameters of inﬂation forecast based rules
to achieve low inﬂation and low output variability if the economic environment—
e.g., central-bank credibility or the anti-cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy—changes.
Additionally, uncertainty about the state of the economy may aﬀect the monetary
rule. Rudebusch (2001) and Smets (2002) argue that coeﬃcients of a Taylor rule are
aﬀected by the imprecision of output gap estimates. As uncertainty about output
growth and inﬂation in the 1970s after the oil-price shocks was presumably higher
than in the 1990s, this could have altered the parameters of the monetary rule.
Moreover, central banks could react diﬀerently to positive and negative devi-
ations of inﬂation or output from target, e.g., the central bank may react more
aggressively to inﬂation if the economy is in a boom than if it is in a recession.
Cukierman’s (1999) model implies that the central bank’s preference for inﬂation
increases with the likelihood of a recession. Jordan (2001) shows that a monetary
control error in combination with asymmetric preferences for output above and be-
low target leads to higher inﬂation. Ruge-Murcia (2001) develops a model where
inﬂation preferences of the central banker are asymmetric. If inﬂation is above tar-
get, the central bank reacts with a restrictive monetary policy, while an inﬂation
rate below target is not countered by an equally expansive policy.
Also empirically time-varying behavior of central banks is supported. Exploiting
the resulting non-linear relationship between inﬂation and unemployment from his
model, Ruge-Murcia (2001) ﬁnds that for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada
the central bank seems to weight positive deviations of inﬂation from target more
heavily than negative ones. Gerlach (2000) assumes a non-linear function for the
output coeﬃcient in a Taylor rule and ﬁnds an asymmetric output reaction for
the FED during the period 1960–79, but no asymmetry for the second half of the
sample from 1980 to 1999. Asymmetric reactions to inﬂation are also found by
Dolado, Mar´ ıa-Dolores, and Naveira (2000) for France, Germany, Spain, and the
United States, using dummy variables for inﬂation above and below target. Finally,
for the FED Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), and Judd and Rudebusch (1998)
split the sample period and show that during the last thirty years coeﬃcients of the
3monetary policy reaction function have changed with diﬀerent chairmen.
Nevertheless, the empirical studies discussed so far have some limitations. Split-
ting the sample period leads to a shortening of the available time series. Instead
of adjusting the sample period, a switching model uses all available data and at
the same time permits more ﬂexibility than a linear model as coeﬃcients can take
diﬀerent values in each regime. Moreover, adoption of a switching model has the
advantage that one does not have to decide prior to the estimation which factors
determine changes in central-bank policy. Thus one can “let the data speak” and
then try to interpret the results in terms of estimated coeﬃcients and the timing of
regime switches. In this paper the base-line speciﬁcation of the Markov-switching
model characterizes central-bank policy as falling into two diﬀerent regimes. One
regime is expected to correspond to an anti-inﬂationary regime with a high weight
on inﬂation and low one on output, while in the second regime the central bank
should take a more accommodative position towards inﬂation with a high coeﬃcient
on output and a low one on inﬂation.
Switching models are also able to deal with the changing variability of economic
time series. The oil-price shocks in the 1970s increased volatility of interest rates,
inﬂation and output. Also the episode of base-money targeting in the U.S. from
1979 to the early 1980s induced considerable volatility in interest rates. Finally, the
turbulences in the European Monetary System (EMS), especially the exchange rate
crises of 1992/93, inﬂuenced monetary policy and the variance of the interest rate.
As these episodes are mostly unrelated to the monetary policy regime in place, they
are assumed to switch independently from switching process driving the coeﬃcients
in the monetary policy rule.
Up to now, few studies have investigated monetary policy reaction functions
with time-varying coeﬃcients. Sims (1999) estimates a 3-state switching model on a
short-term interest rate and the consumer price index with simultaneous switching
in the coeﬃcients and the variance. He ﬁnds that diﬀerent regimes in the distur-
bances help improve the ﬁt of the model while diﬀerent coeﬃcients are less impor-
tant. Owyang and Ramey (2001) estimate a model where the inﬂation target as
well as the NAIRU switch independently between a low and a high state. They ﬁnd
that monetary policy in the United States has switched between an accommodative
“dove” regime and a less accommodative “hawk” regime. To our knowledge, mon-
etary policy rules with switching coeﬃcients have not been estimated for European
countries yet, except for Dueker and Fischer (1996) for Switzerland. It therefore
seems interesting to investigate changing policy reactions for European countries in
a Markov switching framework and to compare the outcome with the results for the
United States.
42 The Model
In an inﬂuential article, Taylor (1993) proposed the following rule as a characteri-
zation of monetary policy.
i
T
t =¯ r + π
∗





Corresponding to the practice of most central banks the interest rate is regarded as
the monetary policy instrument. Taylor assumes that the federal funds rate should
rise if inﬂation, π, rises above target or if output, y, rises above its trend value. In
equilibrium the deviation of inﬂation and output from their target values is zero
and the desired interest rate, iT, is the sum of the equilibrium real rate, ¯ r ,p l u st h e
target value of inﬂation, π∗. The last two terms of equation (1) show the inﬂuence
of the deviation of inﬂation from its target value and the inﬂuence of the deviation
of actual output from its trend value, y∗. Taylor assumed a value of 2 % for ¯ r and
for π∗, a trend output growth of 2.2 %, and weights of 1.5 for β and 0.5 for γ.H e
showed that the actual interest rate policy of the FED from 1987 to 1992 has been
conducted as if the FED had followed such a policy rule.
Instead of assuming speciﬁc values for the coeﬃcients, the literature generally
has estimated weights for the reaction function. To keep things simple, Taylor’s
(1993) original rule considers the deviation of inﬂation over the last four quarters
from target. Most central banks, however, do not target past or actual but expected
inﬂation. In the literature, therefore, in general forward looking—i.e., inﬂation
forecast based—rules are considered.5 This allows the central bank to take various
relevant variables into account when forming its inﬂation forecasts.
Starting point for the empirical model is the following central bank reaction
function developed by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998). The central bank’s desired
target interest rate iT depends on the deviation of expected inﬂation j periods ahead
from its target value, π∗, and the expected output gap k periods ahead; i∗ is the

















For monetary policy to be stabilizing, the weight on the inﬂation gap should exceed
unity and the coeﬃcient on the output gap should be positive. A coeﬃcient greater
than unity on the inﬂation gap means that the central bank pushes up the real rate in
response to higher inﬂation, which exerts a stabilizing eﬀect on inﬂation. A positive
coeﬃcient on the output gap entails lower interest rates in situations where output
5See Amano, Coletti, and Macklem (1999), Batini and Haldane (1999) or Clarida, Gal´ ıa n d
Gertler (1998, 2000).
5is below normal and thus has a stabilizing eﬀect on the economy. By investigating
monetary policy rules one thus can check if monetary policy has behaved adequately
over time.
To account for the observed autocorrelation in interest rates, a dynamic adjust-
ment for the interest rate is used.





wiit−i + εt with ρ ∈ [0,1],
n  
i=1
wi =1 ( 3 )
Equation (3) states that the central bank does not adjust the interest rate immedi-
ately to its desired level but is concerned about interest rate smoothing. Inserting
equation (3) into equation (2) yields the following equation












2.1 Non-linear Taylor Rules
In empirical applications, diﬀerent forms of dealing with time variation in the pa-
rameters of a monetary policy reaction function have been used. One possibility
is to split the sample at the presumed break date and estimate the equation for
both periods separately. This approach has been taken by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler
(2000) or Judd and Rudebusch (1998), who investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent central
bank presidents on monetary policy for the FED, and also by Neumann and von
Hagen (2002) who test for changes in the Taylor rule due to the introduction of
inﬂation targeting in a sample of six countries.
Another approach is to use dummy variables to estimate diﬀerent coeﬃcients de-
pending on inﬂation or output being above or below target (Dolado, Mar´ ıa-Dolores,
and Naveira 2000). The disadvantage of these methods is that one has to ﬁnd ex-
ogenous information indicating that a switch in regime has occurred. Splitting the
sample shortens the available time series. This is not attractive as in the estimation
it is generally assumed that long-run inﬂation and the long-run real interest rate
equal their equilibrium values, which is only the case if the sample period is suﬃ-
ciently long. While this problem is avoided in the dummy variable approach, also
here the researcher has to maintain a hypothesis what factors are responsible for a
shift in regime.
The assumption of a non-linear function for the coeﬃcients in a Taylor rule, as in
Gerlach (2000), or for the relation between inﬂation and unemployment as in Ruge-
Murcia (2001), is an interesting alternative to the approach pursued in this paper.
In contrast to a sudden switch in regime, a non-linear function implies a gradual
change in central-bank behavior as the respective variable deviates from target.
6Besides the diﬀerent nature of regime shifts modeled by a non-linear function and
the assumption of Markov switching, in switching models no a-priori assumptions
on the causes of the regime shifts or the functional form for the changes in regime
have to be made.
Markov switching models ﬁrst have been used in business-cycle and exchange-
rate analysis (Hamilton 1989, Engel and Hamilton 1990). However, they also have a
natural interpretation for monetary policy, as argued above, since monetary policy
rules are unlikely to be constant over time. Markov switching is an attractive way
to model the succession of diﬀerent regimes where switching between regimes does
not occur deterministically but with a certain probability. These regimes are not
classiﬁed ex-ante but are estimated from the data. Apart from estimating how
much weight the central bank puts on relevant economic variables like inﬂation and
output, one can investigate how these weights change over time.
Assuming that the central bank’s reaction to the deviation of inﬂation from
target and the output gap depends on the monetary policy regime in place, the
model equation becomes













As it is common in the literature,6 it is assumed that the long-run inﬂation target
is constant during the sample period so that it can be subsumed into the constant
term in the regression, i.e.,
α =¯ r − (β − 1)π
∗.
Without further assumptions, values for both the long-run inﬂation target or the
equilibrium real interest rate cannot be recovered simultaneously from the estima-
tion. If one makes an assumption on either variable—e.g., by setting the equilibrium
real interest rate equal to the ex-post sample real interest rate—one can derive a
value for the other variable.
The coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output gap are allowed to depend on the
unobservable state of the economy S1,t with the transition probabilities p1 and q1,
i.e., they can take a diﬀerent value in each regime:
β(S1,t) ∈{ β1,β 2},γ (S1,t) ∈{ γ1,γ 2},β 1 >β 2.
The state variable, S1,t, can be thought of as representing the monetary policy regime
that prevails at date t. The regimes are normalized such that the ﬁrst regime has a
6See, e.g. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000), Clarida and Gertler (1997) or Judd and Rudebusch
(1998).
7high coeﬃcient on inﬂation. Neither sign or magnitude of coeﬃcients nor the timing
of the switches between both are imposed. The only assumption is that there are
two diﬀerent regimes for β and γ, with the estimation procedure classifying each
observation as belonging to either regime with a certain probability.
In addition to switching in the coeﬃcients, the variance of the error term is













The process for the variance, S2,t, follows a Markov-switching process that is in-
dependent from the process governing the switching in the coeﬃcients. While the
process S1,t represents shifts in the monetary policy preferences, the state variable
S2,t accounts for shocks to the interest rate that are not captured in the reaction
function, such as inﬂuences from the exchange rate. Periods of high and low vari-
ance can occur independently from the regime for the coeﬃcients. Though one could
let the variances switch simultaneously with the coeﬃcients, we want to avoid that
periods of high volatility dominate the assignment of diﬀerent coeﬃcients to restric-
tive and less restrictive periods of monetary policy. For example, during exchange
rate crises for the EMS countries interest rates showed times of high volatility that
were not necessarily related to the monetary policy regime. A speciﬁcation with
two independent Markov processes thus is more ﬂexible since each monetary policy
regime can be associated with a low and a high variance.
In the empirical speciﬁcation the constant and the coeﬃcient on the lagged de-
pendent variable are not allowed to switch. It is thus assumed that the autocorre-
lation in the interest rate is not regime dependent, meaning that the central bank
has the same concern for interest rate smoothing in both regimes.7 The constant,
which comprises the equilibrium real rate and the long-run inﬂation target, does
not depend on the monetary policy regime as in the long run the equilibrium real
rate should be independent from monetary policy. If the equilibrium real rate is




¯ r − α
β(S1,t) − 1
.
Even if the constant, α, is regime-independent and the real rate is assumed to be
equal across regimes, the implied inﬂation objective, ¯ r, will be diﬀerent for each
7We do not want the autoregressive coeﬃcient, ρ, to inﬂuence the classiﬁcation of observations
into either monetary policy regime so that S1,t should only drive switches in β and γ but not in
ρ. Introducing a third Markov process for switches in the ρ would result in over-parametrization
of the model.
8regime. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000) ﬁnd that for the United States the diﬀer-
ence between monetary rules in diﬀerent time periods is better captured by diﬀerent
β coeﬃcients than by diﬀerent constants. If β<1, the path for inﬂation is unstable
because the central bank does not raise interest rates enough to keep pace with
inﬂation, and there exists no equilibrium to which inﬂation would return. In this
case, the implied inﬂation objective, π∗, is not deﬁned.
For Germany and the United Kingdom the monetary policy rule is estimated as
set up in equation (4). Estimation of a Taylor rule presumes that the country has
been able to optimize between a domestic output and inﬂation target. For Italy
and France this may not have been the case during the longer part of the sample
period considered. Both countries were members of the EMS and had to conduct
their monetary policy under an exchange rate constraint, so that they have not been
able to consider only domestic variables in setting monetary policy.8 To allow for an
inﬂuence from the EMS on domestic monetary policy therefore the German interest
rate is included into the reaction function for France and Italy.9 In accordance with
the literature, Germany is regarded as the leading country in the EMS, while the
other member countries had to conduct their monetary policy such that they kept
the exchange rate to the German mark ﬁxed.
The speciﬁcation for France and Italy thus supposes three diﬀerent states for
the coeﬃcients. While the ﬁrst two states are identically to those under monetary
policy independence, in the third state the interest rate is set according to the
German interest rate. The model thus becomes as follows:















wiit−i + ut. (5)
with iG denoting the German interest rate. The Markov process governing the





8The inﬂuence of the EMS membership on monetary policy in the U.K. is not investigated
as the U.K. was only member from October 1990 to September 1992. This episode is too short
compared to the sample period of 28 years to give meaningful results.
9See Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1998), Wyplosz (1999), Dolado, Mar´ ıa-Dolores, and Naveira
(2000), Mihov (2001).
9The third state thus presumes that domestic variables play no role in setting mone-
tary policy. Instead, the domestic interest rate is set in relation to the interest rate
in Germany.
For the United States it is well documented that the time of the Volcker disin-
ﬂation from 1979 to 1982 creates problems in the estimation of a monetary policy
rule (see e.g. Fair 2001). As this period is characterized by an exceptionally high
volatility of the interest rate, it seems warranted to allow for three states in the
















The regimes are ordered according to their residual variance. Like in the model for
Germany and the United Kingdom, the process governing the switching coeﬃcients
can take two diﬀerent values as in equation (4).
In the case of three possible regimes either for the coeﬃcients or for the variance,
the transition probability matrix is no longer 4 × 4 but 6 × 6 with eight transition
probabilities to be estimated in the case of independent switching processes.10 To
restrict the number of parameters, the transition probability matrix governing the
switches between the three regimes is assumed to show equal probabilities for a
change into either one of the two other regimes. The transition probability matrix




p (1 − p)/2( 1 − p)/2
(1 − q)/2 q (1 − q)/2
(1 − r)/2( 1 − r)/2 r

.
This means that from regime 1 the Markov process can pass with equal probability
into regime 2 or 3, and so on. Instead of estimating eight transition probabilities,
this restriction reduces the number of parameters to ﬁve.
2.2 Markov Switching
For ease of exposition we refer in the following to the two-state model with two
independent switching processes. The extension to a three-state process is straight-
forward. S1,t and S2,t are assumed to evolve according to a two-state, ﬁrst-order
Markov process, i.e., the probability Pr[Sj,t=i|Ψt−1],j=1 ,2o fb e i n gi nap a r t i c u -
lar state i =0 ,1i np e r i o dt only depends on the state prevailing in period t−1. The
case of two independent Markov processes can be regarded as switching between four
diﬀerent states, i.e., two regimes for the coeﬃcients of the monetary policy reaction
10Six transition probabilities are coming form the three-state Markov process, plus two transition
probabilities for the independent, two-state Markov process.
10function with two diﬀerent variances for each regime. Instead of considering two
independent processes, a single Markov-switching process St is deﬁned such that
St =1 i f S1,t =0 a n d S2,t =0 ,
St =2 i f S1,t =0 a n d S2,t =1 ,
St =3 i f S1,t =1 a n d S2,t =0 ,
St =4 i f S1,t =1 a n d S2,t =1 .
In general, the transition matrix for a four-state Markov process is 4×4 and would
have 12 free parameters. With two independent switching processes, however, the
transition probabilities for S1,t =1 ,S1,t =0 ,S2,t =1 ,a n dS2,t = 0 have to sum up
to unity individually. The elements of the transition probability matrix for the four
states therefore can be written as products of the transition probabilities for both
processes that are denoted as follows:
p1 =P r ( S1,t =1 |S1,t−1 =1 ) ,
q1 =P r ( S1,t =0 |S1,t−1 =0 ) , (6)
p2 =P r ( S2,t =1 |S2,t−1 =1 ) ,
q2 =P r ( S2,t =0 |S2,t−1 =0 ) .
The series St,t=1 ,2,...,T provides information about the regime the economy is
in at date t. To obtain the probability for being in the ﬁrst monetary policy regime,
S1,t = 0, one has to add the probabilities for the regimes St =1a n dSt =2 .F o rt h e
probability of being in the low variance state, S2,t = 0, one has to add St =1a n d
St =3 . I fSt were known before estimating the model, one could apply a dummy
variable approach and deﬁne β, γ and σ as
β = S1,tβ0 +( 1− S1,t)β1,




0 +( 1− S2,t)σ
2
1.
This would correspond to the approach Dolado, Mar´ ıa-Dolores, and Naveira (2000)
follow by choosing the episodes with inﬂation above and below target, or output
above and below trend. Splitting the sample into the oﬃce terms of the diﬀerent
chairmen, like Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) and Judd and Rudebusch (1998)
do, also can be regarded as a special case of the dummy variable approach. In the
Markov-switching approach, however, St is assumed to be not observed, and the
assignment of the regimes is estimated from the data.
11To estimate the model, one has to consider the joint distribution f(it,S t|Ψt−1)
of it and St, which can be factored into
f(it,S t|Ψt−1)=f(it|St,Ψt−1)f(St|Ψt−1),













and Ψt−1 denoting information at time t − 1 (see Kim and Nelson 1999). The
likelihood function is thus a weighted average of the density functions for the four











Given a process for the evolution of the states, the model can be estimated using an
iterative Maximum Likelihood procedure. Pr[St = j|Ψt−1] denotes the conditional
probability that the tth observation is generated by regime j. At the beginning of




Pr[St = j|St−1 = k]Pr[St−1 = k|Ψt−1],
where Pr[St = j|St−1 = k] are the elements in the transition matrix that can be
e x p r e s s e di nt e r m so fp1, q1, p2 and q2, see equation (6). At the end of each period,
the probabilities are updated using the following iterative ﬁlter (Kim and Nelson
1999),
Pr[St = j|Ψt] = Pr(St = j|Ψt−1,i t)( 8 )
=
f(it|St = j,Ψt−1)Pr[St = j|Ψt−1]
 4
j=1 f(it|St = j,Ψt−1)Pr[St = j|Ψt−1]
,
with f(it|St = i,Ψt−1) as deﬁned in equation (7). At the end of period t,t h e
tth observation of the dependent variable, it, contains new information about the
state of the economy, St,i np e r i o dt. Equation (8) shows that the conditional
distribution of the state St,P r [ St = j|Ψt−1,i t], is given by the conditional joint
density of it and St, divided by the density of it. Once the model is estimated and
Pr[St = j|Ψt] is generated, one can use an algorithm developed by Kim (1994) to
estimate the smoothed probability for regime St using all information in the sample,
i.e., Pr[St = j|ΨT], where t =1 ,2,...,T.
The Markov-switching model is estimated using the BFGS algorithm in a recur-
sive, non-linear optimization routine. All estimations are performed with RATS 5.0.
12Starting values for the optimization routine are obtained from an OLS regression
with a grid search over a plausible range of the switching coeﬃcients to ensure that
a global maximum of the likelihood function is attained.
3T h e D a t a
The model is estimated with monthly data, starting in January 1973 for all countries.
For France, Germany, and Italy as members of the European Monetary Union the
sample ends in December 1998, because with January 1999 the responsibility for
monetary policy went to the European Central Bank and a country-speciﬁc short-
term interest rate does no longer exist. For the United States and the United
Kingdom the sample period runs until December 2000.
Since the Taylor rule considers the interest rate as the monetary policy instru-
ment the overnight money market rate is used. The output gap is calculated as
the diﬀerence between the logarithm of industrial production and its trend value,
which is computed with the HP-ﬁlter.11 Figure 1 shows the short-term interest rate,
inﬂation and the output gap. For all countries inﬂation and interest rates decline
markedly during the 1990s. The exception is Germany where Uniﬁcation lead to a
rise in the interest rate and in inﬂation at the beginning of the 1990s. The volatility
of all variables generally is higher at the beginning of the sample, which should be
captured by the switching variance process. From 1973 to 1980 the ex-post real in-
terest rate is low or even negative, and volatile. Thereafter it is consistently positive
and has an average value between 3.5 % for Germany and the United States, and 5.7
% for Italy. The data already indicate that monetary policy might have changed in
the course of time. Moreover, the countries show broad similarities in the develop-
ment of the regression variables so that one can expect also to ﬁnd similar monetary
policy rules.
For the empirical analysis of equation (4) a measure of expected inﬂation and the
expected output gap has to be constructed. For both variables dynamic forecasts
from a vector autoregression (VAR) are used.12 The VAR is speciﬁed with 12 lags of
the interest rate, inﬂation and the output gap as endogenous variables. As exogenous
variables a constant, the 12th lag of the slope of the yield curve, and the 12th lag
11For a detailed list of the data and the sources, see Appendix A.
12Expectations thus are not rational as expected inﬂation—which depends on past interest
rates—is determined dynamically by using interest-rate forecasts from the VAR and not from
the estimated switching Taylor rule. A joint estimation of the Taylor rule and expected inﬂation,
however, is diﬃcult because future inﬂation depends on the monetary policy regime so that expec-
tations will be path dependent. As VARs are widely used in macroeconomic forecasting and the
system includes the same endogenous variables as the monetary policy rule, the assumption that
economic agents form their expectations according to this VAR seems justiﬁable.
13of world commodity price inﬂation are included, so that forecasts are based only on
variables dated time t−1 or earlier.13 Expected inﬂation is computed as the twelve-
step ahead forecast for inﬂation, and the one step-ahead forecast for the output gap
is used. In other words, values of j =1 2a n dk = 0 are chosen for expectational terms
in equation (4). Robustness of the estimation results to changes in these variables
are examined in Section 4.2. There is no distinction between diﬀerent regimes in
this ﬁrst-stage estimation. In the second step the monetary policy reaction function
is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation as described above.
To account for autocorrelation in observed interest rates, equation (4) includes
lags of the dependent variable. The number of lags is determined by a Lagrange-
Multiplier (LM) test for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in a linear regression without
Markov switching. For France, Germany, and the United States three lags of the
dependent variable are included. For the other countries two lags seem suﬃcient
to remove ﬁrst-order autocorrelation from the residuals. Then, the switching model
is estimated with the preferred number of lags. Results for the Markov-switching
model are not sensitive to the lag length used.
4 Results for Time-Varying Taylor Rules
Table 1 gives the results for the estimation of equations (4) and (5).14 The upper
part of the table shows the coeﬃcients for the ﬁrst and the second regime. The
constant and the autoregressive term are not allowed to switch with the monetary
policy regime. For the autoregressive coeﬃcients only the sum of the coeﬃcients on
the lagged interest rate is reported. T-values are calculated from an approximation
to the inverse of the information matrix.
For all countries two distinct monetary policy regimes are found. In addition,
for France and Italy a third regime emerges in which the German interest rate plays
a role for domestic monetary policy. The coeﬃcient on the expected inﬂation rate
for the ﬁrst regime is signiﬁcant and greater than unity for all countries, ranging
from 1.20 for Italy to 1.81 for the United States and implying an aggressive reac-
tion towards expected inﬂation. In the second regime inﬂation coeﬃcients for all
countries are smaller than unity and are insigniﬁcant for Germany and Italy. This
means that in the second regime the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate
13As the coeﬃcients are estimated over the whole sample period, forecast are in fact in-sample
predictions. Due to the high number of parameters in a VAR, a recursive estimate would lead to
a too high loss in degrees of freedom and unreliable forecasts especially at the beginning of the
sample period.
14The reported coeﬃcients are the long-run coeﬃcients without the inﬂuence of the autoregressive
terms, i.e., they give the values of α, β, γ and λ.
14if inﬂation deviates from target, but not enough to drive also the real rate into the
same direction. For France and Italy the German interest rate appears with a highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule. For France, the coeﬃcient estimate is with
0.82 close to the weight of 0.87 Dolado, Mar´ ıa-Dolores, and Naveira (2000) ﬁnd
for the German interest rate in the French reaction function. While the weight for
France is slightly below unity, the coeﬃcient for Italy exceeds unity, implying that
during the third regime Italy had to move its interest rate even more than Germany
did. This results for Italy seems more plausible than the coeﬃcients of −0.29 and
−0.23 for the German interest rate in the Italian reaction function found by Mihov
(2001) and Wyplosz (1999).
The output coeﬃcients are generally less precisely estimated. For France, Ger-
many, and the United States at least one output coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant on the
5% level, while for Italy both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant only on the 10% level. As
conjectured, the ﬁrst regime—with a high weight on inﬂation—is associated with
a lower coeﬃcient on output than the second regime for France and the United
States.This means that the monetary policy switches between a “dove” regime with
a high weight on output and an anti-inﬂationary “hawk” regime. For Italy and
the United Kingdom, output coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant so that monetary policy
is mainly deﬁned via inﬂation. For Germany, the regime with the low weight on
inﬂation is also associated with a low weight on output, though point estimates for
the output gap coeﬃcient are relatively close together, meaning that the diﬀerence
in the reaction to output is small between both regimes.15
The sum of the coeﬃcients on the lagged dependent variable is between 0.91
and 0.96, which implies a high degree of persistence in interest rates. The reported
t-statistics on the ρ coeﬃcients are computed for the null hypothesis of ρ =1 .T h e y
indicate that ρ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity, so that the regressions do not
contain a unit root.
The lower part of Table 1 gives the estimates for the standard deviation of
the residuals in each regime as well as the transition probabilities p1, q1 and r1
for switching in the monetary policy regime, and p2, q2 and r2 for the variance
switching process. For all countries one can clearly distinguish between a regime
with a low residual standard deviation and one with a high standard deviation. The
low standard deviation ranges from 0.17 for the United States to 0.30 for Italy; the
high standard deviation is 5 to 10 times higher and lies between 1.13 for France and
2.03 for Germany.
All transition probabilities are close to unity, meaning that the regimes show
15The relative magnitude of the output coeﬃcients for Germany and Italy is aﬀected by the
measure of the output gap, see Table 4.
15high persistence—a feature that is common in the estimation of Markov switching
models (see e.g., Sims 1999).
Figures 2 to 6 show the smoothed probabilities for the Markov processes gov-
erning the coeﬃcient and the variance switching (on the left scale), together with
the short-term interest rate (on the right scale).16 At the beginning of the sample
period, all countries except for Germany are in the second regime, which is char-
acterized by an accommodative reaction to inﬂation. Before the second oil-price
shock Germany also shortly switches into the accommodative regime, but is back
in the aggressive regime after the oil-price shock at the time inﬂation starts to rise.
After the inception of the EMS in 1979, Italy and France follow the German interest
rate policy until around 1983. After 1983, France and Italy follow a conservative
policy oriented towards domestic monetary variables. The United States follow a
more conservative monetary policy starting at the end of the 1970s, while the United
Kingdom switches to the aggressive regime only in 1983. Following the interest rate
rise in Germany around German Uniﬁcation, the German interest rate again became
important for France, but not for Italy. With the recession of 1990/91 monetary
policy in the United States became accommodative. For the European countries a
switch into the accommodative regime happened after the EMS crisis in 1993. As
at that time inﬂation was falling, an accommodative monetary policy in fact means
that interest rates were not lowered enough to prevent the real interest rate from
rising. Nominal interest rates fell, nevertheless, because of the central bank’s reac-
tion to the drop in the output gap. Only the United Kingdom, where the sample
period is two years longer, experiences after a moderate increase in interest rates
another transition to the ﬁrst regime in 1997, when the Bank of England gained its
independence.
Especially for Germany, a close correspondence between changes in interest rates
and regime switches emerges. The ﬁrst regime with a high weight on inﬂation is
associated with periods of rising interest rates, e.g., from 1979 to 1982, and from
1988 to 1994. This means that the Bundesbank in such instances rises the interest
rate more than inﬂation, and lets the real interest rate increase by 0.6 percentage
points. In periods of falling interest rates—except for the years 1973 to 1977 and
around 1993—the second regime prevails. In such situations interest rates fall only
because of the output gap since in the second regime the estimate of the inﬂation
coeﬃcient, β2, for the Bundesbank is close to zero. For the Bundesbank thus a bias
towards a restrictive monetary policy is present, as rising inﬂation is countered more
16The interest rate as the endogenous variable in the estimation is depicted to ease interpretation
of the timing of the states. As the monetary policy regimes depend on inﬂation and the output
gap, the presentation of only one of these variables might be misleading. Nevertheless, inﬂation in
general follows quite closely the movements of the interest rate, see Figure 1.
16aggressively than falling inﬂation. This conﬁrms the results by Dolado et al. (2000)
who ﬁnd that the Bundesbank raises the interest rate by 1.8 percentage points if
inﬂation rises by 1 percentage point, but lets the real rate rise by 0.7 percentage
points if inﬂation falls by 1 percentage point.
Figures 2 to 6 also show the smoothed probability for being in the low variance
regime together with the short-term interest rate. While the model for the European
countries allows switching between two diﬀerent variances, for the United States
three variance regimes are allowed. For the United States, the high-variance regime
3 is assigned solely to the time of the Volcker disinﬂation and the targeting of
the monetary base from 1979 to 1983. The exceptionality of this episode is well
documented in the literature.17 Regime 1, which has the lowest variance, occurs
from 1975 to 1979, at two occasions during the 1980s and during the 1990s. Regime
2 with a with an intermediate variance prevails until 1975 and during two short
episodes in the 1980s. Though Germany shows the highest volatility, this state
occurs only for a short time, mainly at the beginning of the sample before the
Bundesbank adopted its strategy of monetary targeting. Concerning the timing of
the variance switches, the European contries fall into two groups. For Germany and
the United Kingdom, the high-variance regime concentrates at the beginning of the
sample. While for Germany the high-variance state is conﬁned to a relatively short
period around the two oil-price shocks, the United Kingdom shows a much longer
time of high volatility, which coincides with the failed attempts to bring inﬂation
down at the beginning of the 1980s (Minford 1993). For France and Italy, variance
regimes tend to be less persistent and switching is possibly caused by tensions in
the EMS. This conjecture is supported by the positive correlation of 0.30 for Italy
and 0.19 for France between the probability of being in the second regime and the
annual depreciation of the Italian lira and the French franc vis-` a-vis the German
mark.
Table 2 shows the expected duration and the unconditional probabilities for the
monetary policy and the variance switching regimes.18 For France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom expected duration of both monetary policy regimes ranges from
one year to approximately four years. For Italy and the United States the expected
duration of the monetary policy regimes is somewhat longer. The variance regimes
last less than two years for most countries, except for the low variance regime in
the United States, which has a expected duration of around six years. Except for
France, the unconditional probability of being in the ﬁrst, anti-inﬂationary regime
17See Fair (2001), Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000), Sims (1999), or Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
18The unconditional probabilities were computed according to the formula given in Garcia and
Perron (1996, p. 113).
17is between 30% and 40%. The unconditional probability of the low variance regime
lies around 80% for France, Germany, and Italy. In the United Kingdom the low
and the high variance regime have an unconditional probability of 50% each, which
reﬂects the much longer time span of high volatility for U.K. compared to the other
countries. In the United States the low variance state occurs with an unconditional
probability of 63%.
4.1 Comparison to a Linear Model
As a Markov-switching model permits more ﬂexibility than a linear model, a compar-
ison between both types of models is of interest. Figure 7 compares the distribution
of the standardized residuals from the Markov-switching speciﬁcation to the residu-
als from a linear regression model containing the same variables. It is apparent that
the Markov-switching model improves the distribution of the residuals, especially by
reducing the number of outliers, i.e., by lowering excess kurtosis as compared to the
linear model. This eﬀect is primarily achieved by incorporating switching between
a low and a high residual variance.
The top panel of Table 3 shows skewness and excess kurtosis for the residuals
from the Markov-switching model and the linear model. For all countries both
measures are much closer to the theoretical values of a normally distributed variable
in the Markov-switching model than in the linear model. Also the value of the log
likelihood function increases considerably for the switching speciﬁcation as compared
to a linear model. The test statistic for a likelihood ratio test of the Markov switching
against the linear model would lie above 200 for all countries. Though likelihood
ratio tests in this case are not strictly applicable as some nuisance parameters are
not identiﬁed under the null hypothesis (see e.g., Garcia 1998), the size of the test
statistic indicates that the Markov switching model is indeed superior to the linear
model.
The eﬀect of switching coeﬃcients for inﬂation and the output gap can be vi-
sualized by looking at the implied target interest rate. A monetary policy rule is
only a shortcut to describe central-bank behavior since actually central banks take
more information into account than can be reﬂected in a simple rule. A comparison
of actual interest rates to the implied target rates from the monetary rule therefore
can give an indication about the appropriateness of the rule to reﬂect actual central
bank behavior.
Figure 8 shows the implied target rates from the Markov-switching model and
the linear model together with the actual interest rate. For the computation of the
implied target rate the autoregressive terms are excluded so that only the inﬂuence
18from the coeﬃcients on output and inﬂation and the constant determine the implied
target rate.19 For France and Italy, the Markov-switching model improves over the
linear model especially at the beginning of the sample period, where the linear
speciﬁcation shows large swings in the implied target rate. For the United Kingdom
the Markov model captures the change in monetary policy that followed the entry
into the EMS and the adoption of inﬂation targeting two years later, while the
linear speciﬁcation does not. At the beginning of the sample period, however, the
implied rates for both models are persistently higher than the actual rate. The
bottom panel of Table 3 shows the mean squared error (MSE) for the deviation of
the actual interest rate from the implied target rate, again without considering the
autoregressive coeﬃcients. Note that this is not a test of goodness of ﬁt for the
Markov-switching versus the linear model but only a comparison of the closeness
of the implied interest rate to the actually observed interest rate. For all countries
the Markov-switching model constitutes a clear improvement, but especially so for
France and Italy.
4.2 Robustness
Finally, robustness of the results with respect to changes in the deﬁnition of expected
inﬂation and the output gap is checked. First, instead of using the HP-ﬁlter the out-
put gap is computed as the deviation of the logarithm of industrial production from
a linear and quadratic trend, see Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1998). Second, actual
inﬂation and the actual HP-ﬁltered output gap are used instead of the forecasted
variables.
Table 4 shows the results for the model with expected inﬂation and the expected
output gap, computed as the deviation from a linear and a quadratic trend. Table 5
gives the results for the estimation with actual inﬂation and the actual HP-ﬁltered
output gap. For brevity, both tables only report the economically interesting β and
γ coeﬃcients. Table 4 shows that size and signiﬁcance of the inﬂation coeﬃcients
remain basically unchanged when the output gap is computed with a linear and a
quadratic trend. For all countries except for the United Kingdom the second regime
now implies a stronger reaction to output than the ﬁrst regime, thus conﬁrming
a switch between a “hawk” regime with a high weight on inﬂation and a low one
on the output gap, and a “dove” regime with reversed weights. In Table 5 inﬂation
coeﬃcients turn out to be somewhat lower than in the benchmark case. In contrast to
the other speciﬁcations, the output response in the second regime now is signiﬁcant
for the United Kingdom. With the speciﬁcation in Table 5 now only France, the
19With the autoregressive terms the ﬁtted values would be much closer for both models so that
the diﬀerence between actual and ﬁtted interest rates would be hardly discernible in the graph.
19United Kingdom, and the United States show output responses that corresponds to
notion of “hawk” and “dove” regimes. In general, however, results are robust to the
change in speciﬁcation.
5 Conclusion
This paper adds to the growing literature on time-varying monetary policy rules.
Switching models are an interesting alternative to a conventional linear speciﬁcation
of a monetary policy rule, as the eﬀects of a changing economic environment on
monetary policy can be investigated without having to determine the dates of the
changes exogenously.
In this paper monetary policy reaction functions for France, Germany, Italy,
the United Kingdom, and the United States have been estimated, using a Markov-
switching model with independent switching processes for the coeﬃcients of the
monetary policy regime and the residual variance. The results show that for all
central banks the weights assigned to inﬂation and the output gap switch between
diﬀerent states. One regime is associated with a high weight on inﬂation, the other
implies that the central bank follows an accommodative policy. Following Owyang
and Ramey (2000) regimes can be classiﬁed as a “dove” regime with a high weight
on output and a low weight on inﬂation, and a “hawk” regime with a high weight
on inﬂation and a low one on output.
Switching in the residual variance apparently captures the eﬀects of one-time
shocks like supply shocks, changes in external constraints or pressure on the exchange
rate that are not modelled explicitly in the monetary policy rule. As compared to a
linear model containing the same variables, the Markov switching model improves
the distribution of the residuals as well as the performance of implied interest rates.
20A Appendix: Data
The interest rate is the money market rate from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) CD-Rom of the International Monetary Fund for the European countries and
the federal funds rate for the United States. All data for the United States are
from the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). Inﬂation is
measured by the annual change in the consumer price index (CPI). The output gap
is calculated as the diﬀerence between the logarithm of industrial production and
its trend value, which is obtained by the HP-ﬁlter with the usual weight of 14400 for
monthly data. Since it is well known that the HP-ﬁlter might give unreliable trend
estimates at the end of the sample period, the ﬁlter was run over a period from the
ﬁrst quarter of 1970 to the last quarter of 2000 for all countries. This longer sample
period was also used to compute the linear and quadratic trend estimates later in
the paper.
Industrial production and CPI data are from the Main Economic Indicators of
the OECD, except for Germany where the CPI is from the Monthly Reports of
the Deutsche Bundesbank. The CPI relates to West Germany only because we
want to avoid to deal with the breaks in the data caused by German Uniﬁcation,
which was followed by a successive lifting of price controls in East Germany. Due
to the limited economic size of Eastern Germany the West German inﬂation rate
diﬀers only marginally from inﬂation for total Germany. West German industrial
production is linked to the series for uniﬁed Germany after 1991, see OECD (2000).
21References
Amano, R.A., D. Coletti, and T. Macklem (1999): “Monetary Rules when
Economic Behaviour Changes,” in Hunt, B. and A. Orr (eds.): Monetary Policy
under Uncertainty: Workshop Held at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 29-30
June 1998, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Wellington, pp. 157-200.
Batini, N. and A.G. Haldane (1999): “Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary
Policy,” in Taylor, J. B. (ed.): Monetary Policy Rules, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Chicago, pp. 157-192.
Blinder, A.S. (1998): “Central Banking in Theory and Practice,” MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Christiano, L.J. and C.J. Gust (1999): “Taylor Rules in a Limited Participation
Model,” De Economist 147 (4), pp. 437-460.
Clarida, R., J. Gal´ ı, and M. Gertler (1998): “Monetary Policy Rules in Prac-
tice: Some International Evidence,” European Economic Review 42 (6), pp. 1033-
1068.
Clarida, R., J. Gal´ ı, and M. Gertler (2000): “Monetary Policy Rules and
Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115 (1), pp. 147-180.
Clarida, R. and M. Gertler (1997): “How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary
Policy,” in Romer, C. D. and D. H. Romer (eds.): Reducing Inﬂation: Motiva-
tion and Strategy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 363-412.
Cukierman, A. (1999): “The Inﬂation Bias Result Revisited,” Foerder Institute
for Economic Research, Tel-Aviv University, Working Paper, No. 99-38.
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999): “Taylor-Zins und Monetary Conditions Index,”
Monatsberichte April, pp. 47-63.
Dolado, J. J., R. Mar´ ıa-Dolores, and M. Naveira (2000): “Asymmetries in
Monetary Policy - Evidence for Four Central Banks,” CEPR Discussion Paper
Series, No. 2441.
Dueker, M.J. and A. Fischer (1996): “Inﬂation Targeting in a Small Open
Economy: Empirical Results for Switzerland,” Journal of Monetary Economics
37, pp. 89-103.
Engel, C.M. and J.D. Hamilton (1990): “Long Swings in the Dollar: Are They
in the Data and Do Markets Know it?,” American Economic Review 80 (4), pp.
689-713.
Fair, R.C. (2001): “Actual Federal Reserve Policy Behavior and Interest Rate
Rules,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review 7 (1), pp.
61-72.
Fischer, S. (1994): “Modern Central Banking,” in Capie, F. and others (eds.):
The Future of Central Banking, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.
262-308.
Garcia, R. (1998): “Asymptotic Null Distribution of the Likelihood Ratio Test in
Markov Switching Models,” International Economic Review 39, pp. 763-788.
Garcia, R. and P. Perron (1996): “An Analysis of the Real Interest Rate under
Regime Shifts ,” Review of Economics and Statistics 78 (1), pp. 111-125.
Gerlach, S. (2000): “Asymmetric Policy Reactions and Inﬂation,” unpublished
manuscript, Bank for International Settlements.
22Hamilton, J.D. (1989): “A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonsta-
tionary Time Series and the Business Cycle,” Econometrica 57 (2), pp. 357-384.
Jordan, T.J. (2001): “Monetary Control Uncertainty and Inﬂation Bias,” Journal
of Economics 73 (2), pp. 125-147.
Judd, J.P. and G.D. Rudebusch (1998): “Taylor’s Rule and the Fed: 1970-
1997,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Review (3), pp. 3-16.
Kim, C.-J. (1994): “Dynamic Linear Models with Markov-Switching,” Journal of
Econometrics 60, pp. 1-22.
Kim, C.-J. and C.R. Nelson (1999): “State-Space Models with Regime Switch-
ing: Classical and Gibbs-Sampling Approaches with Applications,” MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Kozicki, S. (1999): “How Useful Are Taylor Rules for Monetary Policy?,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review 84 (2), pp. 5-34.
Levin, A., V. Wieland, and J.C. Williams (1999): “Robustness of Simple Mon-
etary Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty,” in Taylor, J. B. (ed.): Monetary
Policy Rules, National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago, pp. 263-299.
Mihov, I. (2001): “Monetary Policy Implementation and Transmission in the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union,” Economic Policy 33, pp. 370-406.
Minford, P. (1993): “United Kingdom,” in Fratianni, M. U. and D. Salvatore
(eds.): Monetary Policy in Developed Economies, Greenwood Press, Westport,
CT, pp. 405-432.
Neumann, M. J. M. and J. von Hagen (2002): “Does Inﬂation Targeting Mat-
ter?,” Zentrum f¨ ur Europ¨ aische Integrationsforschung, Bonn, Working Paper,
No. B01.
OECD (2000): “Main Economic Indicators, Sources and Deﬁnitions,” www.oecd.org
/std/meimeta.pdf,.
Owyang, M. and G. Ramey (2001): “Regime Switching and Monetary Policy
Measurement,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper, No. 002A.
Romer, C.D. and D.H. Romer (1989): “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New
Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz,” in Blanchard, O. J. and S. Fischer
(eds.): NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 121-170.
Rudebusch, G.D. (2001): “Is the Fed Too Timid? Monetary Policy in an Uncer-
tain World,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (2), pp. 203-217.
Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2001): “Inﬂation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences,”
Banco de Espa˜ na, Documento de Trabajo, No. 0106.
Sims, C. A. (1999): “Drift and Breaks in Monetary Policy,” unpublished manuscript,
Princeton University.
Smets, F. (2002): “Output Gap Uncertainty: Does it Matter for the Taylor Rule?,”
Empirical Economics 27 (1), pp. 113-129.
Taylor, J.B. (1993): “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, pp. 195-214.
Wyplosz, C. (1999): “Towards a More Perfect EMU,” CEPR Discussion Paper
Series, No. 2252.
23Tables and Figures
Table 1: Results for Taylor Rule Estimation.


















































































































































L -143.82 -129.21 -210.67 -348.59 -70.81
Note: Estimation of equations (4) and (5) in the text. T-values in parentheses; the t-value
for ρ is computed for the null hypothesis of ρ = 1. The sample period is 1973:1 to 1998:12
for the EMU countries and 1973:1 to 2000:12 for the United Kingdom and the United
States. The transition probabilities p1, q1 and r1 are associated with switching in the
coeﬃcients, p2, q2 and r2 with variance switching. L is the value of the log likelihood
function.
24Table 2: Expected Duration and Unconditional Probability of Regimes.
France Germany Italy U.K. U.S.
Mean duration in years
Monetary policy regime 1 1.11 1.87 6.42 2.37 6.55
Monetary policy regime 2 2.07 2.22 7.22 3.72 14.43
Monetary policy regime 3 1.21 3.43
Variance regime 1 1.06 2.51 1.58 1.72 5.90
Variance regime 2 0.31 0.56 0.35 1.74 1.45
Variance regime 3 1.99
Unconditional probabilities
Monetary policy regime 1 0.25 0.46 0.38 0.39 0.31
Monetary policy regime 2 0.47 0.54 0.42 0.61 0.69
Monetary policy regime 3 0.28 0.20
Variance regime 1 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.50 0.63
Variance regime 2 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.50 0.16
Variance regime 3 0.21
Note: Values derived from the estimates in Table 1.
Table 3: Comparison of Markov-Switching Model to Linear Model.
France Germany Italy U.K. U.S.
Skewness MS model 0.50 −0.04 0.10 −0.08 −0.10
Skewness linear model 1.87 −0.41 1.38 −0.02 −1.98
Kurtosis MS model 0.69 1.85 0.28 1.29 0.92
Kurtosis linear model 11.12 19.07 11.89 4.90 28.72
L MS model −143.82 −129.21 −210.67 −348.59 −70.81
L linear model −273.36 −382.11 −315.08 −484.40 −308.39
MSE MS model 4.43 5.52 8.75 12.04 8.50
MSE linear model 6.08 6.24 26.48 13.38 11.54
Note: The ﬁrst panel shows skewness and excess kurtosis (i.e. above the theoretical value
of 3 for a normal distributed variable) for the residuals from the Markov-switching (MS)
and the linear model. The second panel gives the value of the log likelihood function. The
bottom panel shows the mean squared error for the deviation of the implied target interest
rate from the actual interest rate.
25Table 4: Taylor-Rule with Detrended Output.













































L -142.74 -129.09 -211.80 -344.71 -68.44
Note: The table gives the coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output for the models in equations
(4) and (5) with expected inﬂation 12 months ahead and the expected, contemporaneous
deviation of output from a linear and quadratic trend.
Table 5: Taylor-Rule with Actual Inﬂation.













































L -150.68 -142.97 -214.92 -342.95 -69.18
Note: The table gives the coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output for the models in equations
(4) and (5) with actual inﬂation and the actual output gap, computed as the deviation
from a HP-ﬁltered trend.


































































Note: The ﬁgure shows the short-term interest rate (thick line) and inﬂation (thin line)
in percent on the left scale. The output gap (broken line) is shown on the right scale.
27Figure 2: Smoothed Probabilities for France.













































Note: The ﬁgure shows the smoothed probability from the model in Table 1 (straight line,
left scale) together with the short-term interest rate (broken line, right scale).
Figure 3: Smoothed Probabilities for Germany.



















Note: The ﬁgure shows the smoothed probability from the model in Table 1 (straight line,
left scale) together with the short-term interest rate (broken line, right scale).
28Figure 4: Smoothed Probabilities for Italy.














































Note: The ﬁgure shows the smoothed probability from the model in Table 1 (straight line,
left scale) together with the short-term interest rate (broken line, right scale).
Figure 5: Smoothed Probabilities for the United Kingdom.




















Note: The ﬁgure shows the smoothed probability from the model in Table 1 (straight line,
left scale) together with the short-term interest rate (broken line, right scale).
29Figure 6: Smoothed Probabilities for the United States.










































Note: The ﬁgure shows the smoothed probability from the model in Table 1 (straight line,
left scale) together with the short-term interest rate (broken line, right scale).
30Figure 7: Residuals from Markov-Switching Model and Linear Model.
France



































Note: The ﬁrst panel presents the standardized residuals from the Markov-switching model
in Table 1, the second panel the residuals from a linear regression on the same variables.
31Figure 7 (cont.): Residuals from Markov-Switching Model and Linear Model.
United Kingdom























Note: The ﬁrst panel presents the standardized residuals from the Markov-switching model
in Table 1, the second panel the residuals from a linear regression on the same variables.








































1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Note: The thick straight line is the actual short-term interest rate, the thin straight line
the implied interest rate from the Markov-switching model and the thin broken line the
implied interest rate from the linear model. Interest rates are in percent.
33